

5 April 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Nelson Rockefeller

**SUBJECT : Federal Activities in Fields of Policy Relevant
to NSC 5502 and NSC 5505**

State Dept. review completed

1. At the meeting of the PCG on 29 March, two general definitions, readily reconcilable with one another, of the Group's field of interest in connection with NSC 5502 and NSC 5505 were proposed. They were the following:

a. The first of these was based upon an analysis of the intent of NSC 5505 and of the recommendations of the Milliken Report. It was pointed out that the policy embodied in NSC 5505 had been described as one of co-existence, with the implication that this NSC paper contained a restatement both of U. S. objectives and of the whole range of U. S. actions undertaken as means to those objectives. In fact, however, this is a misinterpretation of the NSC paper and of the underlying Report. In all of the discussion leading up to NSC 5505, a clear distinction was maintained between (1) what the U. S. hopes to accomplish, (2) what the U. S. actually does to achieve its ends, and (3) the official and public posture adopted and maintained by the U. S. as it takes these actions. NSC 5505 is not concerned at all with U. S. objectives (we would still like nothing better than to destroy the communist regimes). It is primarily concerned with the public posture of the United States regarded as a means of accomplishing well-established ends, that is, with the image of U. S. attitudes, purposes, and modes of action that exists in the minds of others and with the manner in which their image of the U. S. affects their behavior. Accordingly, the paper is concerned with what the United States actually does insofar as courses of action determine or affect the public posture of the United States. It is true that the actions of the U. S. affect the behavior of people in other countries in ways other than by modifying their image of the United States. But, at least within the Soviet Bloc, these other impacts of U. S. actions upon the behavior of others are not of great magnitude and are not readily calculable. The first suggestion, then, concerning the PCG's field of interest was that it should concern itself with those policies and activities of the Federal Government which are important determinants of the public posture of the U. S. in the above sense.

b. The other definition grew out of a remark that NSC 5505 and the underlying Milliken Report were concerned with ways and means whereby

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- 2 -

the U. S. can influence the course of events in countries within the Soviet Bloc. Although it is of course true that events in the non-communist world all have their repercussions behind the Iron Curtain so that logically everything that happens in the world may have an impact on the course of events within the Bloc, nevertheless, in the NSC paper and the underlying Report attention was focused on those actions of the U. S. Government designed to have a more or less direct impact on the course of events within the Bloc, to the exclusion of the U. S. actions which would have their effect upon the communist countries only by way of their effect in strengthening or weakening the Free World. Accordingly, the second suggestion as to the PCG's activities was that it should concern itself with the former category of Federal activities and policies to the exclusion of the latter.

c. These two definitions may readily be combined. When this is done, they mark off as the area relevant to NSC 5505 those Federal activities and policies which do (or which may) directly influence the course of events within the communist bloc by determining or modifying the public posture of the U. S., that is, the image of U. S. intentions, attitudes, and modes of behavior which exists in the minds of citizens of the communist bloc. (It should be emphasized that this is offered as a characterization only of that part of the PCG's terms of reference that grows out of NSC 5505.

2. This definition obviously includes a vast amount of territory and a list of more concrete fields of interest could take several forms. It may be helpful, however, to suggest some of the more obvious and more important activities that directly determine what has here been called the public posture of the U. S.

a. Probably the most important are the great public announcements of policy, major undertakings entered into by the U. S., and the more massive political and military actions. Notable recent examples are: The President's "Atoms for Peace" proposal; the conduct of thermonuclear tests, especially those conducted outside the U. S.; the Southeast Asia Treaty; the pressure for German rearmament; the size of the U. S. military budget.

b. Of lesser importance than these great national actions is the whole flow of major speeches, diplomatic notes and other official documents, and actions which, though of secondary importance in themselves, are taken by foreigners to be highly indicative of U. S. attitudes. Current examples include: Statements about the imminence of war; policies with regard to the granting or the refusal of permission to Soviet Bloc citizens to enter the U. S.; policies with respect to travel abroad by U. S. citizens including both the travel of "normal" citizens to the Soviet Bloc and the

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- 3 -

travel of "suspected" citizens anywhere outside the U. S.; policies toward all kinds of contacts between American professional groups and professional people from behind the Iron Curtain; statements concerning the participation or non-participation in a whole variety of public or private activities which involve participation by communists and non-communists; and the U. S. information program itself.

c. A third category of activities which must powerfully affect the image of the U. S. in the minds of the citizens of the Soviet Bloc are those having to do with relationships between U. S. on the one hand and certain emigre groups and certain non-communist governments on the other. Since emigre groups themselves are apt to be vocal in the expression of views concerning actual events and the possible and desirable course of events in communist countries, their actual or believed connection with the U. S. Government is bound to be regarded by communist peoples as especially indicative of U. S. attitudes. Likewise, it may be surmised that certain non-communist states are widely believed to be in effect U. S. satellites. The obvious examples are South Korea and the Taiwan regime. (Perhaps in a well ordered world they really would be satellites.) It is only natural to assume that there is considerable concern in Moscow with the utterances of the chiefs of these states, a concern which parallels intense interest in the goings-on in the satellites. In a broader sense, the image of the U. S. may be considerably affected by the degree to which people at all levels in the Soviet Bloc are convinced that U. S. behavior toward the rest of the non-communist world reveals an attitude of bellicosity and intransigence or of mere firmness and reasonableness. Some recent examples of behavior toward third areas or outside groups which directly affect the posture of the U. S. are the following: The military alliances with South Korea and the Taiwan regime; alleged excessive emphasis on military aid as against economic development in the whole range of underdeveloped nations in Asia and the Middle East; the willingness or unwillingness of the U. S. to work with the political Center or even the moderate Left as distinguished from the extreme Right in many countries of Europe and Asia; the willingness of the U. S. to support certain extreme Rightist regimes notably in Latin America and some parts of the Middle East; and of course the semi-official support of many emigre groups.

d. Last, but not least, in their influence on the public posture of the U. S. is the whole category of "domestic" utterances, policies, and actions that seem either to reaffirm the character of American civilization as one directly (although of course imperfectly) expressive of the values the country has stood for since its foundation or which alternatively undermine and call into question the truth of that image. Examples would be superfluous.

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Remarks:
 Mr. Bissell hand carried the original and first three carbon copies of this to the people indicated on the distribution on 5 April. *gjj*

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